



“Run with the fox and hunt with the hounds”: managerial trade unionism 




This article examines the evolution of managerial trade-unionism in the 
British coal industry, specifically focusing on the development of the 
British Association of Colliery Management (BACM) from 1947 until 
1994. It explores the organization’s identity from its formation as a 
conservative staff association to its emergence as a distinct trade 
union, focusing on key issues: industrial action and strike cover; 
affiliation to the Trades Union Congress (TUC); colliery closures; and 
the privatization of the coal industry. It examines BACM’s relationship 
with the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and the National 
Association of Colliery Overmen, Deputies and Shotfirers (NACODS), 
the National Coal Board (NCB) and subsequently the British Coal 
Corporation (BCC). This is explored within the wider context of the 
growth of managerial trade unions in post-war Britain and managerial 
identity in nationalized industries. 
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The British Association of Colliery Management was a very British 
institution in that it seemed to have the freedom both to run with 
the fox and hunt with the hounds … Although it never really joined 
in the dispute [1984-5 miners’ strike] when it came, it took some 
getting used to a situation in which people who clearly laid full 
claim to being representatives of “management” could, and did, 
through their union, criticize that management.1 
Former NCB chairman Ian MacGregor’s vituperative attack on BACM 
reflected the breakdown between the two parties and their distinct 
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outlooks on the future of the industry in the 1980s. It was also indicative 
of the BACM leadership’s distinct organizational and occupational 
locations; BACM was in many ways forged and sustained by 
nationalization. Many of its members were proud and protective of the 
industry and its nationalized track record, as well as being occupationally 
and geographically socialized within coal mining.2     
 
This article examines the formation, development and politics of BACM 
against the changing historical context of the nationalized coal industry. 
First, it extends our understanding of the role and identity of managers 
within the coal industry, specifically under nationalization, who, like 
colliery deputies and overmen, have been neglected in the 
historiography.3 Second, it explores the world of managerial trade 
-unionism, building on an older literature that gradually disappeared from 
view as the phenomena it was studying declined.4 In so doing it questions 
a number of characterisations both general and specific made about 
managerial and white-collar trade unions. Alongside historical work by 
Melling on the Association of Supervisory Staffs, Executive and 
Technicians (ASSET), the article interrogates earlier claims by George 
Sayers Bain, that white-collar workers were not motivated by social 
location or occupational characteristics.5 
 
BACM is located within to Blackburn’s concept of ‘unionateness’. A 
measure of BACM’s character as a trade union can be gleaned from using 
Blackburn’s scale of ‘unionateness’. Blackburn identified seven indicators 
of ‘unionateness’.  The first three ‘variable’ indicators depend on a union 
being primarily concerned with representing its members in collective 
bargaining and protecting their rights (rather than acting as a 
professional regulatory body or a welfare organization); the union being 
separate of employers so that it can represent its membership 
independently; and lastly its willingness to use industrial action to achieve 
its ends. The remaining points on Blackburn’s scale involve the union 
being registered as a trade union; declaring itself to be a union; affiliated 
to the TUC; and finally, affiliated to the Labour Party.6 The analysis also 
builds on Perchard and Zweiniger-Bargielowska work on managers in the 
3 
 
Scottish and south Wales coalfields. It is informed by BACM records (now 
housed at the University of Nottingham, previously held at the BACM 
offices in Doncaster), the National Mining Museum of Scotland, and Tyne 
and Wear Archives.7  Use of these collections was complemented by a 
number of interviews, the published recollections of key actors, and the 
diary of the NCB South Wales Area director, Phillip Weekes (held at the 
National Library of Wales).  
 
The wider relevance of a study of BACM is underlined both by the scale 
and importance of Britain’s nationalized coal industry (and other 
socialized corporations), which invested heavily in a managerial 
revolution. In the 1950s, the NCB was the largest single employer in 
Europe, with an output almost matching that of the entire European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC).8  Established in 1947 to represent the 
industry’s managerial personnel, BACM represented a new experiment in 
the sphere of UK industrial relations. Nationalization and the 
professionalization of management that accompanied it were crucial in 
the formation and shaping of the organization.9 Managers have remained 
largely a spectre at the feast in much of the literature of the coal 
industry. At best, they have been talked about as a homogenous 
grouping, at worst, characterized as shady villains of the piece, variously 
as the ‘same crew in different jerseys’ or in terms of the ‘macho 
management’ of the 1980s.10 In various cases, it was a well-deserved 
reputation, but as this article makes clear, managers within the industry 
were a complex body affected by a variety of factors. One of the few 
early studies of managerial unionism in the industry described them as 
follows: 
 
Colliery officials strongly identified themselves with their employers. 
Their individualistic, pro-employer orientation stemmed from the 
scattered nature of the coal industry, the small size and heterogeneous 
nature of the managerial unit at collieries, promotion possibilities which 
broke down group solidarity and the resistance of the coal-owners to 
trade unionism among their staffs, resistance which often took the 




As Perchard has illustrated, even prior to nationalization, this is a 
characterization that requires qualification. Many managerial employees 
prior to public ownership were indeed isolated (poorly paid and educated, 
and with low labour market mobility and lacking in social capital), but 
they were increasingly vocal in their criticisms of their conditions and the 
way the industry was being run by private companies.12 The paucity of 
investment in managers’ education was a factor raised well into 
nationalization.13 And yet, as one of the official historians of the industry 
in the twentieth century Barry Supple has pointed out, the decision to 
nationalize the industry, resulted, at least in part, from the, ‘tension 
between colliery managers who wished to plough resources into 
development and directors who were reluctant to find more money or 
give up available profits.’14  Fishman argued that it was, ‘“progressive” 
managers’ support for radical change which ensured nationalization was 
well received by public opinion.’15  
 
The importance of BACM extends beyond the confines of the coal industry. 
The organization represented the ‘new’ and ‘modern’ technocrats that 
swelled the ranks of the British middle class between 1931 and 1951. 
BACM’s members were the ‘professional functionaries’ in the ‘responsible 
society’, in which the Labour government placed so much faith and sought 
to accommodate. They were an example of what Savage et al referred to 
as ‘managerial workers, dependent upon organization asset’ who have 
remained, ‘one of the great mysteries of British history’.16 If 
nationalization can be interpreted as a crowning peak for ‘the rise of the 
professional society’ – rather than the ‘commanding heights’ of a socialist 
vision – then it was also fundamental to the granting of an independent 
voice to the technocratic expert; by 1980, 25% of British managers were 
union members, of these 60% were in the public sector.17   





Formed in August 1947 – from the merger of the 7,000 strong British 
Association of Colliery Officials and Staff (BACOS) and the colliery under-
managers association – BACM may have been a ‘new departure’ for the 
coal industry, but it was by no means the pre-eminent ‘experiment’ that 
its president claimed for it.18   The Electrical Power Engineers’ Association 
(EPEA) represented managerial and professional employees in the power 
-generation industry from 1913, and ASSET, representing managers, 
higher technicians and professionals in the engineering industry was 
granted negotiating rights by the Engineering Employers’ Federation (EEF) 
in 1944.19 The emergence of managerial trade-unionism, as part of the 
broader growth in white-collar unionism, was heavily dependent on 
employer recognition and union density. As such, it is not surprising that 
density amongst managerial employees was highest in the nationalized 
industries, where a separate voice for managers was enshrined in the 
formal machinery of arbitration.20  
 
The transformation of management within the coal industry was 
influenced by a number of factors, but underlying them a sense that, 
‘moral imperatives’, rather than ‘simple market advantage’ be placed, ‘at 
the centre of discussion of what are traditionally thought to be “economic 
issues”’.21  Unlike the empty rhetoric of the Mining Association of Great 
Britain (the body representing Britain’s coal owners prior to 
nationalization), which had promised ‘to raise the profession of mining 
engineers to a level at least equal to that of any other scientific and 
technical profession’, the NCB transformed managers’ status.22  And 
managers saw an immediate improvement in their salary, conditions, and 
opportunities for professional development. Moreover, they acquired an 
independent voice within the industry, distinct from other professional 
associations, such as the Institution of Mining Engineers (IME) and the 
Association of Mining Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (AMEME). This 
initiative owed much to the commitment and support of Labour 
ministers.23  The NCB’s treatment of managerial employees, which 
contrasted sharply with the private coal companies, helps to explain the 
increasing, if qualified, support among many mine management 




Managerial identity was also shaped by the NCB’s organizational culture. 
When nationalizing the coal industry, the Labour government drew on a 
number of models.  Foremost among these was the example advanced 
by Morrison in his 1933 plans for socialized transport. His Socialisation 
and Transport envisaged a public corporation, which ‘must be no mere 
capitalist business’. This, Morrison proposed, would be staffed by a 
board and officers, ‘in the splendid tradition of public service, loyalty and 
incorruptibility in the British Civil Service’, who ‘must regard themselves 
as the high custodians of the public interest’.24 It was imperative that 
the aim of these ‘socialized industries’ be to ‘promote the maximum of 
public well-being and status, dignity, knowledge and freedom of the 
workers by hand and brain employed in the undertaking’. Those 
managing these corporations should be selected ‘primarily on suitable 
grounds of competence’, ‘must graduate from within that industry’, and 
embrace public service.25 ‘Socialism’, as a Labour Party pamphlet for the 
1945 general election declared, meant, ‘carrying the managerial 
revolution to its logical conclusion’. This was to be facilitated, in Labour’s 
technocratic vision, by a ‘progressive and professional’ modern 
management. As both McKibbin and Savage observe, it was this 
technocratic vision that sold ‘socialism’ to the middle class, although the 
class location of mine management professionals remained both complex 
and contestable.26  
Ministers and the NCB sought to build an esprit de corps within the 
organization, through an integrated technical and management education. 
The NCB’s most senior managers were initially enrolled at the 
Administrative Staff College (ASC) at Henley. This educated senior civil 
servants, as well as managers from other nationalized industries and 
various other patrician British companies (such as Cadbury, the British 
Aluminium Company, and Imperial Chemical Industries), with the 
institution’s standards set down by the newly founded British Institute of 
Management. The midwives of the ASC intended it as, ‘a meeting place of 
the two main categories of administrators – the officers of the private and 
of the public services’, in which they should learn that, ‘they must work 
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together’ and ‘acquire, so far as may be, the characteristic virtues of the 
other, and know its own characteristic defects’. All of this knowledge was 
to be ‘directed to the fuller service of the public interest’. As one United 
States observer of the college in the 1950s noted: ‘A special virtue of 
Henley is its recognition that government and business leaders must be 
trained in common problems of policy and administration if they are to 
understand each other and take independent but consistent action 
designed to further the common interest of the nation’.27 All colliery 
managers were educated through the NCB’s own staff college, established 
in the late 1950s, charged with ‘developing and unifying management in 
the industry’.28 Education was delivered both in-house by the NCB and in 
university mining departments. The move towards greater 
professionalization was also prompted from within the ranks of 
management, notably by the former chief inspector of mines, NCB board 
member, and prominent mining engineer, Sir Andrew Bryan, who was to 
become the BACM’s first interim president.29 Whether this inculcated, as 
Jonathan and Ruth Winterton detected, a ‘managerial unitary philosophy’ 
within the NCB over time is debatable given experiences leavened by 
location, occupation, and personal outlook.30  
 
The internal politics of BACM reflected the legacy of the role and status of 
managers in the private industry, as well as the new opportunities and 
tensions arising from nationalization. The divisions within BACM were 
reflected in contests over managerial functions and status, and affiliation 
to the Trades Union Congress (TUC). Changing energy policy and the 
growing programme of colliery closures also witnessed a shift in the 
politics of BACM, including fostering alliances across the mining unions. 
These issues highlighted the contested locations occupied by managers 
and the ‘moral choices’ made by them. The changing culture of BACM 
illustrates the transition from ‘staff association’ to a recognisable 
managerial ‘closed union’.31  These shifts within BACM were to be reflected 
in the background, politics and style of the union’s officers. 
 




The shifting politics of BACM was no more in evidence than in the contrast 
between the first (permanent) national president of the union from 1947 
to 1956, Major Stanley Walton-Brown, and the general secretary from 
1947 to 1959, Major Robin W. Anderson, and the leadership of Jim Bullock 
(national president, 1956-1969) and latterly George Tyler (general 
secretary, 1959-1973). Walton-Brown and Anderson were doubtless 
uppermost in Bullock’s mind when he observed in a presidential address in 
1961 that colliery managers and mining engineers were ‘largely 
Conservative in outlook’, and ‘resented nationalization at its outset’.32 In 
contrast, Bullock and Tyler’s tenure marked a watershed in the union’s 
development, coinciding with the growing crisis in the industry as 
successive governments looked to other energy sources, the colliery 
-closure programme escalated, and national strikes in the 1970s and 
1980s. In this climate, Bullock and Tyler were crucial in laying the 
foundations for their successors – Charles Alexander, Norman Schofield, 
Doug Bulmer, and Alan Wilson – who continued their legacy, steering 
BACM as an independent managerial union through challenging times.  
 
Walton-Brown and Anderson represented a certain type of owner-manager 
who had vested financial interests in the private coal companies and had 
occupied senior positions within the industry. Walton-Brown spent most of 
his working life in Northumberland – apart from attending a minor English 
public school and military service during the First World War – where his 
father had also been a senior mining engineer. At the time of 
nationalization, he was managing-director of the Seghill Colliery Company. 
Outside the industry, Walton-Brown filled the roles of a district and county 
councilor, and magistrate, as well as being president of his local 
Conservative Association.33 Walton-Brown and Anderson were neither 
‘natural’ trade unionists nor enthusiasts for nationalization, approaching 
their relationship awkwardly with a mixture of private deference and 
public belligerence. Yet, for all the indignation, in the closed environment 
of their first meeting with the NCB, BACM had pledged to be a ‘very 




Walton-Brown’s loyalties, and view of nationalization, were made 
abundantly clear in his public pronouncements. In a speech to the BACM 
annual conference in 1953, he declared: ‘In a monopolistic industry, the 
ideas of a National Coal Board and their managers as employees no longer 
coincide to the same extent as was the case under the former regime’.35  
Although some managers undoubtedly shared Walton-Brown’s views, 
others tentatively embraced nationalization.36 The dominance of former 
owner-managers, such as Walton-Brown, and the entrenched sense of 
hierarchy among others had a profound effect on the executive bodies 
within BACM. Tensions increased between the ‘mining groups’ (colliery 
managers, mining engineers and senior production officials) and allied 
mining professionals (mining electrical and mechanical engineers, safety 
officers, and mines surveyors) over the dominance of the national 
executive (NE) and the national joint council (NJC). As late as 1975, three 
out of the nine vocational groups that made up BACM, representing half of 
the union’s membership numbers, were not represented on the twelve 
person NJC. In contrast, the ‘mining groups’, representing 18% of the 
membership, held 39% of the seats on the NE and 42% on the NJC.37  
These tensions between the ‘mining groups’ and other branches of the 
mine management professions would come to a head in BACM in the 
1970s. This was reflected at branch level too; ‘mining groups’ dominated 
the Scottish, the Durham, and Northern branches until the 1970s.38  This 
inculcated the initial conservatism of BACM’s outlook at the national level.  
However, the reorganization of managerial functions and the growing 
confidence among other groups within BACM was to challenge this 
hegemony. It was also to heighten internal tensions. 
 
Much of BACM’s business in the early years was taken up with opposing 
the replacement of perquisites traditionally offered to managers with a 
more transparent salary structure and allowances. While the elimination of 
perquisites did see an initial loss in earnings in the early 1950s, 
managerial grades experienced a dramatic improvement in pay, 
conditions, prospects and representation compared to private ownership. 
BACM’s relationship with the NCB was initially not aided by attempts in 
Durham, Yorkshire and Scotland to recruit NACODS and NUM members. 
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BACM received a rebuke from the chairman Lord Hyndley for ‘poaching … 
of a flagrant kind’.39 The bitterness these disagreements with the NCB 
inured was evident from Walton-Brown’s speech to the second annual 
conference in 1948: ‘there has never been a time when the management 
and staff were so disgruntled […] so ready to talk of industrial action’.40 
Walton-Brown’s rancor, and capacity for fanciful exaggeration, was still 
evident as he wrote his parting message as BACM President in 1955: 
 
It is a far cry back to the days of 1947 when this Association 
commenced its task of putting the relationships between the Board and 
the Union on a firm and proper basis. At that time we were faced with 
an atmosphere created by the first Board whose conception of the 
Management Staff dated not merely back to feudal times but even 
further, perhaps even to the days of Rome, Egypt and Babylon when 
slaves might be seen but certainly not heard.41  
 
Prosecutions of managers under the Coal Mines Act 1911 continued to be 
a bone of contention. While the Mines and Quarries Act 1954 introduced 
further clarification, acknowledging both the role of higher levels of 
management and the diffusion of management functions, colliery 
managers and under-managers bore the brunt of the responsibility. The 
shortcomings and inequities of this became ever more evident with the 
productivity drives from the late-1950s onwards.42   
 
In the vanguard of the mood for change were Bullock and Tyler. In their 
backgrounds, managerial style and political outlook, Bullock and Tyler 
could scarcely have been more different than Walton-Brown and 
Anderson. Bullock was born into a household of miners. After leaving 
school at thirteen, he worked as a miner, junior official, and under-
manager, before becoming a colliery manager. He remained a Labour 
Party supporter, an advocate of nationalization and a committed trade  
-unionist.43 Tyler also came from a mining family, left school at fourteen 
to become an apprentice fitter, and subsequently worked for six years 
underground. He went on to study mining, when he discovered an interest 
in trade-unionism and social sciences, which he studied at the Universities 
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of Nottingham and Oxford. During the 1930s and 1940s, Tyler worked 
with the South Wales Miners’ Federation organizing holiday camps for 
unemployed miners. From 1947 he held numerous posts around the 
country for BACM.44 Their backgrounds were important in recommending 
them to many managers. As one former Scottish BACM official recalled: 
‘Jim Bullock was the best leader that BACM have ever had, and, yes, there 
was a change in the attitude of the management union […] He came up, 
as you’ll know, from the pit. He was a pit family. Brother, father, uncle, 
Tom Cobley, and all were miners. He was from a mining village and he 
was a hands-on man.’45   
 
Bullock and Tyler forged a distinct and independent agenda for BACM; one 
that they argued was in keeping with their role as trade-unionists. They 
highlighted the double-standards implicit in the government’s granting of 
increases in salaries for board members while urging wage restraint from 
the mining unions.46 Breaking with Walton-Brown and Anderson they 
became vocal in their criticisms of the failure of successive governments 
to alleviate the distress of the contraction of the industry, to develop a 
robust national fuel policy, and worked nationally with the NUM and 
NACODS to lobby against closures in the 1960s.47  This strategy found 
favour with Bullock and Tyler’s leadership coinciding with a 39% growth in 
BACM membership from around 12,000 in 1956 to a peak of 16,700 in 
1964. By the 1970s, BACM claimed union density of 95% among NCB 
managerial grades.48 While the declining fortunes of some coalfields and 
the specialization of management functions (and growth in allied 
management professions) in part explain the shifting politics of the union, 
it is no small measure of Bullock and Tyler’s effectiveness that they 
managed to elicit the following response from the chairman of the Durham 
branch in April 1963 (which was among the new leadership’s most vocal 
critics): ‘a great tribute should be paid to Mr. Bullock … despite the 
number of closures … not one single Member had actually been sacked 
from his post because of redundancy’.49   
 
Enduring malaise between the NCB and BACM was due to the perceived 
lack of consultation over production targets, colliery reviews and closures. 
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Increasingly, the sense of alienation became visible both among individual 
managers and collectively through BACM. This growing sense among 
operational managers that they were subject to direction by national edict 
was allowed to fester. Discontent grew over the subjugation of local 
managers to unrealistic, nationally devised productivity targets, 
victimization, forced early retirement, and redundancies. After the NCB 
chairman Lord Robens lectured BACM members on the need for 
consultation at their 1963 annual conference, locally and nationally anger 
started to mount over the Board’s own failure to consult managers.50 
BACM was becoming more stridently independent and particularly critical 
of government by the 1960s over issues as energy policy and colliery 
closures. This criticism also extended to the government’s restriction of 
compensation of pneumoconiosis sufferers with BACM declaring in March 
1973: 
 
Pneumoconiosis is an insidious and often a devastating dizease. Only 
those who know or visit the homes of men suffering from it can 
appreciate the full extent of the disability, pain and suffering … It 
would seem only just and fair that these blameless victims of the 
Industry should be adequately compensated. The Government’s 
decision to set up a Royal Commission to report upon the problems of 
compensating persons who have been injured is to be welcomed.  But 
pneumoconiosis victims should not have to wait for the 
recommendations of such a Commission; they are more akin to the 
thalidomide tragedies, and should be considered and treated in the 
same way.51   
 
If BACM’s preoccupation had initially been ‘the protection of members’ 
occupational interests’ their tactics shifted markedly under Bullock and 
Tyler.52 This was primarily shaped by pragmatism and the experience of 
operating both within the wider post-war arena of industrial relations, and 
specifically the NCB conciliation and arbitration mechanisms. Bullock and 
Tyler both utilized and recognized the limitations of ‘discursive 
confrontation’. They distinguished between the success of (and benefits to 
be accrued by) managerial unions that extended their sphere of influence 
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through fora like the TUC, and those who foundered in professional 
isolation.53 This change reflected the determination of key figures at 
national and branch levels to transform the outlook of the union. Changing 
UK energy policy and the industrial politics of coal brought Bullock and 
Tyler’s successors into ever more vocal condemnation of UK government 
policy and finally by the 1980s into open conflict with Ian MacGregor and 
the Conservative governments of Margaret Thatcher and John Major. 
BACM’s claims to trade-unionism were to be markedly tested by debates 
over such issues as strike cover and TUC affiliation. 
To cover or not to cover: BACM and industrial action 
No single issue illustrated the complexities and contested locations of 
managerial trade unionists as their position over industrial action. BACM 
remained fundamentally opposed to the use of the strike weapon. 
However, from the first annual meeting in 1947, BACM agreed that in the 
event of industrial action, ‘members ought not to do the work of other 
bodies on strike, except in matters involving the safety of the pit’.54 This 
was subject to an unsuccessful challenge at the 1952 conference when the 
South Western branch attempted to have the rules amended to ‘do 
everything in their power in the interests of safety [and] keep everything 
going.’55 This policy was brought sharply into focus during the 1972 strike. 
Prompted by requests from branches for clarification of the position during 
the dispute the union remained steadfast in its position: ‘Members ought 
not to do the work of strikers except in matters involving the safety of the 
pit in its strict and proper sense [authors’ emphasis].’56  
BACM remained opposed in principle to industrial action but sympathized 
with the NUM and was vocal in laying the fault at the door of the former 
NCB chairman, Alf Robens, for what it perceived to be a direct result of 
the introduction of the National Power Loading Agreement in 1966.57 
BACM and the NUM national executive committees had agreed on safety 
cover in the event of official industrial action two years previously.58 How 
this was enforced at a local level led, however, to claims and counter-
claims of illegal working and intimidation by pickets, contrary to 
agreements, concluding with an exchange between NUM general secretary 
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Lawrence Daly and Tyler, subsequently reported in BACM’s National News 
Letter. Daly wrote to BACM on the back of reports that members had been 
flouting the rules over strike cover and producing coal. Tyler responded 
rebutting these claims and questioning the behavior of pickets in relation 
to the intimidation of BACM and National Association of Colliery Overmen, 
Deputies and Shotfirers (NACODS) members covered by the agreement 
with the NUM NEC. Tyler couched BACM’s position around the long-term 
survival of pits, although he was forced to admit that finance staff had 
been breaking the agreement: 
Do you really expect our members to allow a pit to be ruined and made 
unfit for work when the strike is over? I know that some of your 
members have publicly declared that they would prefer that to happen, 
rather than to compromise on pay claims… Whatever our members are 
doing at pits, they are not producing coal.  Any activity they are 
undertaking is equally in the interests of your members as ours 
because it would be a very hollow victory indeed if, as a result of the 
strike, some pits (and it could be many) are never able to open 
again.59    
Charles Alexander, Bullock’s successor as BACM national president made a 
moral appeal to members justifying safety cover on the basis of ensuring 
survival of the industry in the same edition of the National News Letter (in 
March 1972), while expressing indignation over the tactics employed by 
pickets: 
However much one might sympathise with the aims of the 
mineworkers, I object strongly to the methods which they are currently 
employing to enforce their demands. The belligerent attitude adopted 
by pickets is not universal against our members, but where obstructive 
practices have been introduced they have been very frightening… In no 
sense can we be accused of strike-breaking.  Not one ounce of coal has 
been produced by the efforts of B.A.C.M. since the strike started, yet 
our people have to suffer abuse and worse every day they go to work.  
We have not the suicidal impulses of those who would destroy their 
means of sustenance and the support of their families. We want this 
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industry to survive because first and foremost we want to work in it 
and live from it … We will fight against joining the vast army of the 
unemployed, and we will fight against any reduction of our living 
standards … That is why we go to work, why we want to preserve this 
Industry, and why we face the daily insults and threats. That is why we 
are management.60 
 
Alexander concluded with what he saw as the responsibility of 
management in a nationalized industry drawing on the spectre of earlier 
periods of disruption: 
  
Because we are management we are conscious that a large part of the 
national asset is being severely damaged and we accept our 
responsibility by our attempts to minimize that damage. Two major 
wars were fought against external forces to preserve our Country and 
its industries; we will use the same determination to preserve the 
system against internal disruption.61   
 
Alexander’s reaction is notable both in capturing the conflict between 
being a manager and a trade-unionist and in voicing generational 
difference and conflict on the picket line. Alexander, who had served in 
the Second World War, used language similar to a number of other 
managers of his generation who took issue with what they saw as the 
unruliness of young miners on the picket lines.62 What proved even more 
contentious for BACM was the ambiguity over unofficial action, with rules 
left purposefully vague on the subject. This allowed BACM members to be 
called upon to undertake duties beyond those necessary for safety in the 
event of unofficial action, as long as consultation took place between the 
NCB and BACM, and conditions over competency and job demarcation 
were met. During a pit deputies’ strike in the East Midlands Division in 
1956, BACM members were instructed to ‘help the board as far as 
possible’, but that ‘no manager or undermanager should act as a deputy’.  
Divisions over BACM’s position on industrial action were also evident 
during a consultation over policy in 1964. While most branches accepted 
the status quo, the Scottish, Northumberland and Durham, and North 
Western branches urged a stronger statement. In particular, they 
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expressed concern that ‘members should not be strike-breakers’. The then 
Scottish branch secretary (and subsequently BACM national president), 
Charles Alexander, insisted that, ‘members should refuse to undertake 
work other than their normal duties’.63 In 1966, BACM rules were flouted 
when engineers were directed to carry out emergency tasks, which they 
were not qualified to undertake, and without prior consultation. It was the 
opacity of BACM’s position on this that led to a motion being raised at the 
annual conference in 1975 to introduce clarity into the rules to ensure that 
members could not be directed to maintain production in the event of a 
strike, which was over-ruled by a sizeable majority.64  
The NEC had issued a policy declaration in July 1964 providing further 
clarification on the position, in particular stating that any task undertaken 
should not contravene safety regulations and not be carried out by 
unqualified officials. Nevertheless, it ‘recommended’ that administrative 
staff at area and divisional levels should ‘help the Board, taking into 
account the conditions’, while directing members to ‘refuse to undertake 
work other than their normal duties unless consultation has taken place.’65 
Differences over the position of members came to the fore again during 
unofficial action at Lynemouth colliery in Northumberland in 1968. The 
NCB approached BACM with a request for members to cover. The branch 
had agreed, on the understanding that it was voluntary, that members not 
be asked to cover NUM and Colliery Officials and Staff Association jobs, 
and that this would be limited to one weekend. All except one of the 
colliery engineers agreed the request. However, at a subsequent meeting 
‘where the Union’s policy had come under fire’, some deputy engineers 
who were sympathetic to the NUM claim entered into a fierce debate with 
the branch secretary. He responded to their request for clarification, with 
an unambiguous statement: ‘management officials who accepted 
management privileges had to accept management responsibilities’.66 In 
essence, these incidents captured the compromised position BACM found 
itself in during unofficial action, and more broadly (as with other mining 
unions) the tensions between national and sub-national regional branches 
and individual members. The 1975 attempt to change the regulations 
once again suggests that those proposing the motion felt morally 
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compelled to challenge a ruling which could be used to direct them to 
continue production. As the clash between the BACM Scottish officials and 
Albert Wheeler during the 1984-5 miners’ strike over safety cover 
illustrated, BACM policy in the event of industrial action continued to be a 
divisive issue.67  
BACM’s position on strike cover illustrated characteristic tensions for 
managerial and white-collar unions. This was reflected in Alexander and 
Tyler’s comments in the aftermath of the 1972 strike. Policy on strike 
cover also exposed the trapeze-like balancing act by the union to maintain 
some semblance of unity. The moral arguments deployed by the national 
leadership in the early 1970s mirrored those they advanced against 
premature closures and ill-conceived UK government energy policy.  
Ultimately divisions among management over future visions for the 
industry would be brought sharply into focus after 1979, particularly after 
the ascension of Ian MacGregor as NCB chairman in 1983. 
BACM and TUC membership 
 
The legacy of Bullock and Tyler’s leadership was also evident in BACM’s 
joining the TUC. Bullock was unequivocal in his support for affiliation, 
declaring in the National News Letter in March 1964: ‘My mind has always 
been clear that any union that wanted to be a union in spirit as well as in 
name should join the TUC’.68 The same month in a memorandum to the 
NEC, BACM’s research officer, G E C Paton, sought to allay the fears of 
sections of the members by stressing the politically independent nature of 
the TUC, as well as the benefits to be accrued from membership. This was 
a tactical move designed to counteract the substantial opposition they 
knew they would face, rather than one that reflected both men's personal 
political outlook. It also reflected BACM leadership’s concerns not to affect 
their independent bargaining position with Conservative administrations.69 
While BACM did ultimately join the TUC, fulfilling a key characteristic of 
Blackburn’s ‘unionateness’, the debates over affiliation illustrate the 




Despite support for the proposals from the Scottish, East Midlands and 
London branches, Bullock and Tyler faced substantial and 
robust opposition within BACM.   In a letter to their branch members in 
1964, the Durham and Northumberland branch (ironically for an older 
coalfield given that lobbying within the TUC could have provided BACM 
with an additional forum in which to campaign against the closure 
programme being ratcheted up) urged their members to vote against 
affiliation, on the grounds that: 
 
[I]t is not, at least at the present time, an organisation to which 
B.A.C.M. should belong. The B.A.C.M. is an Association which caters for 
Management Grades and there are other Unions which are not affiliated 
to the T.U.C., which, whilst not perhaps being as wholly management 
in outlook as we are, nevertheless, also cater for senior officials.70 
 
This revealed the contested position of BACM’s managers’; something that 
Paton had attempted to address, adapting the statement of the general 
secretary of the Institution of Professional Civil Servants to their 
members: ‘In the event of the Society’s affiliation to the T.U.C., this would 
not in the slightest way affect the position of a member of the Executive 
Class occupying a managerial position, who would continue to adopt a 
wholly impartial attitude to public issues’. 71  The Durham and 
Northumberland branch’s circular, and a subsequent sharp rebuke from 
Tyler, highlighted the regional differences within the organization. The 
subsequent vote in September 1964 was characterized by a low response 
(37%), with 37% voting in favour. The following year, Bullock and Tyler 
sought to address concerns expressed by sections of the membership, re-
emphasizing the union’s outlook and the changing politics of the TUC: 
  
The T.U.C. itself is concentrating increasingly upon economic and social 
questions and the growing influence of affiliated black-coated unions 
will help to ensure that in time purely political questions are left to 
political parties. In the event of affiliation the Society will react to 
questions as it does now according to how these affect our relationship 




Bullock and Tyler also highlighted what they saw as the benefits of 
membership, namely access to the network of corporatist bodies, such as 
the National Economic Development Council giving BACM more of a voice 
in discussions over the industry’s future. In addition, since the Bridlington 
Agreement of 1939, TUC membership also offered a measure of protection 
against forced mergers. Nevertheless, they continued to face considerable 
opposition. One critic writing in the The National News Letter in 1966, 
accused Bullock and Tyler of being ‘out of touch with the BACM 
membership’, arguing that TUC affiliation would embroil them in debates 
about Rhodesia and Vietnam.73   
 
By the time Bullock and Tyler stepped down in 1969 and 1973 
respectively, BACM was still deeply divided over TUC affiliation; a vote in 
1970 returned a 58% majority against. By 1975, the majority of the NEC 
supported TUC membership. A number of explanations for this change of 
heart have been posited. First, the UK’s entry into Europe and the 
platform that the TUC provided for representing the industry’s long-term 
interest. Second, concerns over energy policy and the future of the 
industry. Third, the Conservative government was urging BACM and the 
First Division Association (representing the senior civil service) to join to 
‘strengthen the representatives of the TUC’ (to counteract the block votes 
of the manual unions and the left). In 1976 a majority of BACM members 
voted in favour of BACM’s affiliation (joining in 1977).74  
 
BACM’s affiliation to the TUC severely weakened attempts, supported by a 
number of Conservative MPs, to create a separate forum to bring together 
managerial unions.  This parallel attempt aimed to forge a Managerial and 
Professional Group (MPG) bringing together the Association of Managerial 
and Professional Staffs (AMPS) and the UK Association of Professional 
Engineers (UKAPE), along with fourteen other unions and associations 
(including the British Medical Association) in 1977. The MPG was further 
weakened when SIMA, UKAPE and AMPS subsequently joined the TUC. 
Within the TUC, managers’ unions campaigned for a specific section. In 
the 1980s, BACM, along with the Engineers’ and Managers’ Association 
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and the British Air Line Pilots’ Association, set up a council within the TUC 
for unions not affiliated to the Labour Party. The intention of this was not 
simply to promote interests of professional and managerial staff within 
TUC, but also to share information, lobby government, and encourage 
other unions to merge with them. In part, as Bamber notes of BACM (and 
other managerial unions), this was a response to rising costs and falling 
membership, increasing unemployment, and the anti-union politics of the 
Conservative government.75 It also built on discussions already taking 
place within BACM, and their collaboration with the NUM and NACODS 
over colliery closures.76  
 
The TUC became an important forum for BACM to lobby government over 
energy policy. This was visible in attempts to lobby against financial 
targets within the Coal Industry Act of 1985 (requiring the NCB to break 
even) – which BACM pointed out to the TUC was ‘likely to cause further 
capacity closures and redundancies’ – and the Central Electricity 
Generating Board’s industrial energy prices, which sought to further lower 
already unrealistic coal prices, as well as over review procedures for 
colliery closures.77 Some pressures could not be resisted with a 
contracting industry and membership. With membership having fallen to 
5,640 by 1993 (many of them retirees), BACM created the Technical, 
Energy and Administrative Management (TEAM) section to create BACM-
TEAM (representing managers and engineers in the energy sector).78  
 
In attempts to foster alliances to lobby for coal and protect the remaining 
jobs in the industry, BACM-TEAM found itself by the twenty-first century 
attempting to foster national reconciliation between the NUM and the 
UDM. In contrast, concerns over factionalism prompted BACM to block 
Scottish branch attempts to affiliate to the Scottish Trades Union Congress 
(STUC) and the Scottish Council (Development and Industry); key 
avenues for lobbying within policy-making circles in Scotland. Though 
other white-collar unions affiliated to the STUC (including the FDA), BACM 
never did. This was fraught with wider tensions over the rize of nationalist 
parties and campaigns for greater decentralization of power in Scotland 
and Wales, and public debates and dissatisfaction over the so-called, 
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‘democratic deficit’ (embracing both the labour movement and business 
interests) by the 1960s and 1970s.79  
 
As with contests over cover for strike policy, debates over TUC affiliation 
reflected battles over struggles within the union – chiefly between the 
‘mining group’ and allied professions – as much as the issue at hand. By 
the 1970s, the pre-eminence enjoyed by the colliery managers and mining 
engineers (though still controlling the NEC and NJC) was being challenged. 
The diffusion of managerial functions also created further tensions. 
Capturing the changes within the union, Moore recounted the ‘coup’ that 
saw the ‘mining group’ ousted from their position of dominance within the 
Scottish branch, after which the colliery managers and mining engineers 
walked out en masse in protest:  ‘Managers always thought […] that they 
should be in charge and that other disciplines were subservient. If you 
like, they were lesser beings [...], “This is our union, you have only pinned 
yourselves on. Therefore we should be in charge”.80  
 
Bullock and Tyler’s campaign, carried on by their successors, for TUC 
affiliation took over a decade to achieve. It exposed the deep-seated 
tensions within BACM between branches and the national leadership, 
posing the fundamental quandary for managerial unions over their claims 
to be a trade union or a professional association. Ultimately as Bullock and 
Tyler presciently observed it was crucial both given the changing context 
of UK energy policy and industrial politics. It would become an important 
forum for BACM in the hard decades that followed. 
 
Building alliances: energy policy and pit closures 
One factor able to unite BACM and other mining unions was criticism of 
the absence of a well-conceived, long-term energy policy. Under Sir 
James Bowman and subsequently Lord Robens, the industry was 
decimated, with 515 collieries closed and 411,200 jobs lost between 1958 
and 1971 alone.81 Notwithstanding their association with the colliery 
-closure programme, both Robens and Bowman sought to alleviate the 
effects. In addition, Robens clashed publicly with Harold Wilson when the 
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latter, convinced of the dawn of the nuclear age and with cheap oil 
supplies, wanted to speed up the contraction of the industry. Robens 
defied ministers by winning a major deal for coal from the Canadian 
multinational Alcan for its Lynemouth smelter over the government 
contracts designed to subsidize the construction of the new generation 
Advanced Gas-cooled Reactors (AGR) and alleviate Britain’s balance of 
payment problems by reducing imports of aluminum. This move was 
symbolic, pitting coal (representing old Labour) against Wilson’s vision of 
the technocratic revolution.  It won Robens few friends among his 
erstwhile Labour colleagues, but admiration amongst coal industry 
managers and BACM in contrast to his ebullient management style (and 
the NPLA), which won him few.82 Against this backdrop, both Bullock and 
Tyler were highly critical of the government’s failure to develop a robust 
national fuel policy.   
The effects of the closure programme required a concerted campaign on 
the part of mining unions. The indignation felt in areas of the coalfields 
was captured in a speech by Michael McGahey, the future NUM Scottish 
Area president and national vice-president, in Ayrshire in 1966: ‘What we 
are experiencing is not the normal process of life of closing down 
exhausted pits but the deliberate, premeditated murder of an industry’. 
Much the same language was used by BACM’s Jim Bullock in a 1969 
documentary, visiting the Yorkshire mining village of Fryston where lived 
and worked: ‘Closing a pit doesn’t just mean closing a pit, it means 
destroying a whole community…What touches us in mining families is that 
this destroys something that I don’t think will ever be built up again.’83 
As one of the ‘exporting divisions’, BACM’s Scottish branch, as well as its 
counterparts in NACODS and the NUM, lobbied Bowman against proposals 
to transfer coal production for Irish markets from Ayrshire to the East 
Midlands. By the early 1960s, BACM nationally were collaborating with the 
other mining unions in lobbying against closures.84  
This was in no small measure affected by the recognition that BACM’s own 
members were leaving the industry as a result of the contraction of jobs. 
Managers were personally affected by the closures as individuals and as 
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part of occupational communities. By 1958-9, of the seventy managerial 
staff they expected to be affected by the closure of thirty collieries in 
Scotland, the Scottish divisional board was only able to give guarantees of 
posts for twenty-seven. A similar picture emerged in the Cumberland and 
Northumberland coalfields. Over the same period, most of the mine 
management staff affected by seven closures in both coalfields were not 
placed, demoted or given short-term contracts mothballing the collieries 
they had worked in. The case of the 39-year old manager of Blackhill 
Colliery in Cumberland is indicative. After declaring that ‘we do not 
foresee alternative employment for this man in the immediate future’, the 
divisional board appointed him to salvage work. He finally found a 
demoted post as an under-manager at Woodhorn Colliery, only for this to 
be closed in 1961. He was offered a post as an undermanager only after 
vigorous lobbying by BACM’s local branch. In another case in Cumberland, 
one of the divisional board’s staff managers visited an assistant colliery 
agent recuperating from an operation in hospital and informed him that he 
was to be retired within three months. By September 1959, the Durham 
divisional board informed BACM that sixteen members under retirement 
age, some as young as fifty-five, were to be made redundant.  
The rancour between BACM and the NCB grew when it was apparent that 
the latter were not honouring the 1953 agreement to maintain the salary 
level of those demoted or transferred because of closures. The refusal by 
the then Conservative Minister of Power, Lord Mills, to change 
superannuation arrangements to make allowances for early retirement 
further inflamed matters, with the Durham and Northumberland branches 
declaring: ‘when men have worked a lifetime in an industry so arduous 
and demanding as mining, they have a right to expect some restful leisure 
in their eventide’.85 In some cases, closures forged a united front between 
the local colliery management and the NUM, such as at Woodend colliery 
in Lanarkshire (which fought the threat of closure for three years before 
succumbing in 1965).86 
BACM was sharply critical of government policy, including the Fuel Policy 
White Paper of 1967. By 1970 BACM was calling for the development of a 
national board that would co-ordinate energy resources and power 
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supplies. Alexander told delegates at the union’s annual conference that ‘if 
there is to be some measure of stability in the power game in this country 
a strong over-riding body must control its destiny’.87 Tyler spoke of the 
bleak future for coal without planning. He wanted, ‘as management to be 
able to say honestly that we can guarantee a future to young men coming 
into the industry’.88 In the brief respite afforded by a renewed interest in 
coal, Alexander declared in the summer of 1971: ‘As far as we in this 
Industry are concerned, this means there should be no more closures, 
with the normal exceptions of the few which will shut because of 
exhaustion of reserves, or unexpected problems like insurmountable 
geological differences’.89  
Deploying arguments over security of supply (against the backdrop of 
delays in the UK’s much-feted new nuclear AGR stations and the oil shock 
of 1971), in June 1972, the president restated that BACM was ‘opposed to 
closure’ on any other grounds than exhaustion of reserves or 
insurmountable financial difficulties, arguing that coal’s ‘value to the 
Nation must not be assessed in the context of short term and markets, 
but on the wider aspect of a future realisable asset’.90  Alexander further 
admonished those in the press who took cheap shots at it and reminding 
them of what it had achieved. As he remarked in March 1972: ‘It would be 
fair to say that the recovery of the nation depended upon the strength of 
the Mining Industry … Notwithstanding some failures, it had achieved this 
“in adversity”… against the forces of nature, against the equally perverse 
forces of government … and against a public which is notoriously fickle in 
its attentions and is always prepared to drop an established and loyal 
service in favour of a modern gimmick [undoubtedly a side-swipe at the 
UK’s nuclear energy programme].’91    
As the national strikes of 1972 and 1974, and NUM policy, symbolized 
rank-and-file discontent, then the changed context in the NCB’s 
relationship with government also played a part. Where Robens had stood 
on a stronger footing given his political alliances and public persona, Ezra 
was an industry figure without the political influence of his predecessor 
under pressure from a confrontational government.92 Notwithstanding 
residual bitterness over conduct during the 1972 dispute, BACM once 
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again cooperated with the NUM, as well as NACODS, in writing to the NCB 
demanding greater involvement, scrutiny and transparency in the review 
procedures process over colliery closures.93 This followed Alexander’s 
commitment at the 1972 BACM conference, as he restated the next year:  
I stated that it ought to be part of the policy of any British Government 
to conserve any supplies of indigenous fuel over which it had absolute 
control. I also stated that it should sustain any industry which was 
actively engaged in the extraction and production of these sources of 
basic power in view of the situation which was developing in the world 
energy markets… I emphasized that our energies should be directed 
towards influencing the political body, in conjunction with the Board 
and any of the other Unions in the Industry…94   
During the NUM overtime ban in 1974, in agreement with the NUM NEC 
and in accord with its own policy, BACM undertook extra duties to guard 
against flooding and fires in pits, in order to protect the industry. While 
BACM remained critical of the dispute, this was directed equally forcefully 
at the government as the NUM.  Commenting in January 1974, former 
general secretary Tyler warned the government to pay attention to 
miners’ concerns remarking: ‘we are close enough to the pit head to know 
that the miners are not kidding’.95  A year later, the new president 
Norman Schofield urged the government to maintain, ‘the right 
atmosphere in the pits’.96 The assault on the industry and mining 
communities – as well as the threat of managerial employees jobs – had 
the effect of coalescing opinion amongst sections of the mine 
management professions, drawing the distinctions between ‘insider’ and 
‘outsider’. The depth of feeling among managers expressed during the 
1984-5 belied two decades of tensions. This was an attack not just on the 
industry (and significantly the organizational culture of the NCB) and 
coalfield communities, but also on their personal identity as individuals 
who had built their careers in coal.   




The appointment of MacGregor to the position of NCB chairman in March 
1983 marked a major watershed in the future of British coal. Even before 
his appointment, BACM had voiced their concerns about the Thatcher 
administration’s management of the industry.97 Two months after 
MacGregor was appointed, in May 1983, BACM’s president, Norman 
Schofield, voiced his fears. Looking at his track record at BSC, Schofield 
stressed that MacGregor been put in post to, ‘run the industry down’.98  
He added that: ‘Should it become obvious that his objective is to butcher 
the coal industry, then the membership of this association will not be with 
him.’99  In October, BACM signed a tripartite agreement with the NUM and 
NACODS to offer, ‘all possible mutual support and assistance to prevent 
further rundown’.100 
 
The animosity between BACM and MacGregor was to reach its peak with 
the strike of 1984-5. This is little commented upon, and indeed 
understood, in the literature of the dispute. By August 1984, the NCB’s 
industrial relations director, Ned Smith, later recalled MacGregor’s tactics 
and utterances were ‘bringing to a head a growing sense of fear and 
discontent, not to say disbelief, in the ranks of … BACM’.101  In a meeting 
with Jimmy Cowan, the NCB’s deputy chairman, shortly afterwards, BACM 
declared that ‘they had lost confidence in the Board, in particular the 
confidence of the Office of the Chief Executive’.102 By autumn, BACM was 
in open conflict with MacGregor over the handling of the dispute. It 
confirmed that in the event of a breakdown of the talks between NACODS 
and the NCB, and a strike by junior officials, they would refuse to allow 
their members to cover miners working in defiance of the NUM.103 The 
same month Phillip Weekes, the NCB’s South Wales Area director, 
recorded in his diary: ‘The man has to go, and go soon.’104 In November, 
BACM declared MacGregor’s management of the industry a ‘disaster’, 
observing to the press: ‘that is not the way to run this industry, which is 
complex and has certain traditions that have to be known and 
understood’.105 The same month, the NCB’s public relations director, 
Geoffrey Kirk took early retirement, observing of MacGregor: ‘he is 
unaccustomed to having people questioning his decisions and pointing out 
consequences’.106 BACM held a ‘torrid meeting with Cowan & MacGregor’, 
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with Weekes noting after in his diary, ‘I am convinced that this pair of 
idiots is so inept that it wouldn’t be impossible to imagine a Third Front 
being opened’, referring to the possibility of BACM joining the NUM on 
strike, alongside the threat of NACODS action.107 The following month 
Smith publicly criticized MacGregor’s ‘balance sheet mentality’ to pit 
closures. In the wake of his departure, The Times reported: ‘Colleagues 
of Mr Smith argue privately that his resignation is just the tip of an 
iceberg of discontent at Hobart House, the board’s head office in 
Victoria’.108 Smith’s departure was followed in February 1985 by Paul 
Glover, the NCB’s director of staff, and Ralph Rawlinson, the technical 
director, leaving the national board with no experienced senior officials.109  
 
As MacGregor’s recollections suggest, the animosity between him and 
BACM was mutual. The gulf between the chairman, and those in the 
industry’s management, was further widened by decisions reached 
secretly with the government’s political advisers, without consulting his 
colleagues. Unlike in the steel industry where he had grown accustomed 
to the qualified support of managers and their union the Steel Industry 
Managers’ Association (SIMA), BACM and MacGregor developed a mutual 
and visceral dislike of each other.110 Unlike his predecessors Ezra and 
Siddall, MacGregor was also an ‘outsider’. In contrast to MacGregor’s close 
proximity to the Thatcher government, Ezra had deeply resented the 
interference of the Heath government in the NCB’s negotiations with the 
NUM in the early 1970s.111   
In Scotland, where one of a number of bullish area directors, Albert 
Wheeler, had been installed, managers were divided over the 1984-5 
strike.112 In the years immediately preceding the conflict, Wheeler sought 
to dismantle the existing colliery-level negotiations and disrupt existing 
relationships between operational management and the NUM. This 
included replacing ‘local’ managers with those brought in from outside, 
with a brief to sever agreements and enforce the new managerial 
prerogatives.  At a meeting of mining engineers in Edinburgh in 1982, he 
excoriated them for taking the path of least resistance. Even before the 
strike, with the introduction of an NUM overtime ban in response to wage 
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claims and closures in November 1983, Wheeler (in contrast to his 
counterparts in England and Wales) refused to permit BACM members to 
support surface cover (management supervisory cover) to allow NACODS 
members to undertake weekend safety and maintenance work. Events 
reached a climax with Wheeler when BACM officials in Scotland requested 
that their members be allowed to fulfill basic maintenance tasks (to 
prevent flooding and falls).  In an act many viewed as tantamount to 
criminal negligence of ‘community resources’ – leading directly to the 
flooding of the Bogside complex and one of Scotland’s largest pits, 
Polkemmet – Wheeler refused the request and threatened any BACM 
member undertaking such tasks with demotion. In Scotland, this narrative 
about ‘insider’ managers pitted against the ‘outsider’ Wheeler has been a 
common theme among both NUM activists and some managers; One 
retired Scottish BACM official interviewed appropriated MacGregor and 
Margaret Thatcher’s characterization of the NUM leadership as the ‘enemy 
within’, to refer to Wheeler as the enemy ‘within our ranks’.113   
Though pursuing a cautious line after the strike – recognizing its lack of 
power and the poor relations with MacGregor and the government – BACM 
made its views on closures and government policy clear, with general 
secretary Alan Wilson declaring in September 1985:  
There will also need to be an acceptance that social factors must be 
taken into consideration. Clearly these are lessons of the past five 
years. Why then the doubts? My fears stem principally from the 
external forces which I am sure from past experience can have such an 
impact upon the industry. I refer to political philosophy and voices are 
already being raised in certain quarters suggesting more 
decentralisation and the privatisation of parts, if not all, of the coal 
industry.114  
Wilson continued with a further rumination on the aftermath of the 1984-5 
strike, lamenting the focus exclusively on the bill: ‘This staggering 
financial cost takes no account of the human cost – the legacy of 
bitterness, estranged families, broken homes, the lingering acrimony and 
the deep divisions within the NUM’.115  
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After the 1984-5 strike, with the dissolution of the NCB and formation of 
the British Coal Corporation in 1987, BACM, in alliance with other mining 
unions, focused its efforts on resisting, and then mitigating the effects 
of, the breakup of the nationalized industry and further closures. In this, 
it was afforded some support by the conclusions of the House of 
Commons Energy Select Committee’s Fifth Report, which pointed out the 
gross disparities in funding being awarded to the nuclear industry over 
coal in crucial areas such as research and development (Department of 
Energy support for the former was 65% of R&D budgets compared to 
2% to the latter) and conclusions that the market could not be relied 
upon for energy security. 
As BACM stated emphatically to news emerging of the further 
contraction of the industry in September 1991: ‘The Association has 
made it clear that whoever is thinking of such a strategy should not 
expect the management staff of the industry to co-operate in their own 
suicide’.116  As well as lobbying the government on the future of the 
industry, BACM placed a motion before the TUC in 1991, including a 
pledge that the Congress support, ‘maintenance of a substantial British 
deep-mining coal industry’, and pledge to, ‘have no confidence in any 
government that turns its back on coal’.117  Ultimately the Union’s 
officers recognized the unrelenting political direction – unsurprisingly 
given the preceding privatizations of British Gas, Britoil, BP, the regional 
electricity companies, and finally, in March 1991, the key power 
generators PowerGen and National Power – with BACM’s ‘National News’ 
commenting on the back of an Adam Smith Institute conference on 
privatization attended by accountants, economists, corporate finance 
and lawyers: ‘My, how the vultures are circling’.118   
In response to the government’s selection of Rothschild & Co. to prepare 
a report on the future of the industry, and the leaking of the document’s 
dismal outlook to selective news outlets in September, BACM president 
Doug Bulmer left little space for misinterpretation: ‘These reports were 
commissioned by the Government as it wishes to privatise the 
industry’.119 Bulmer pointed out that the net effect was to sow doubt 
about the future of the industry: ‘Whether we privatise or not will be 
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decided by the result of the General Election which will probably be held 
next Spring. The issue of privatization has been overshadowed by the 
emergence of doubts over our continued existence…’120 He also took a 
sideswipe at the Conservatives’ long-time intellectual apostles of 
privatization, the Institute of Economic Affairs economist, Stephen 
Littlechild, over the timing of electricity contracts and for privatization.121 
By December 1992, Bulmer concluded: 
At this stage we can only deduce that the Government’s underlying 
policy objective for coal has for a long time been to break the power of 
the NUM and to demonstrate the failure of public ownership. With its 
newly established reverse Midas touch [a direct attack on Conservative 
management of the wider economy over the recession of 1991-2] this 
objective has failed on both accounts… From a national interest point of 
view, the policies pursued for a long time have been negative 
regarding the coal industry. The scale of inequality of treatment is such 
that the Government should be required to demonstrate clearly why it 
took the decisions that it did. Long term strategic considerations seem 
to have been of no account. How did we get into this mess?122   
What Bulmer, BACM and the other mining unions were witnessing (in a, 
by then, well-practiced way) was the systematic discrediting of the 
industry, using public relations firms, and the dismantling of public-owned 
power generation and supply. Meanwhile, the mood in the coalfields, 
among managers (as with miners and deputies) was grim; the BACM 
branch secretary covering Scotland, the north-east of England and 
Yorkshire, reported despondently of the decision of British Coal to 
suspend the colliery-review procedures in September 1992: ‘At any other 
time, or in different circumstances, it would be pleasing to report this fact 
but I suspect that this is just the calm before the storm – or even before 
a hurricane.’123  Bill Marshall (‘Big Willie’, as he was known amongst his 
colleagues), a deputy manager and between 1988 and 1991 a BACM 
Scottish branch committee member representing deputy, remembers of 




BACM and the other mining unions organized lobbies, demonstrations and 
gained widespread support in their criticisms of the 1992 colliery-closure 
programme. While acknowledging the ‘gratifying’ ‘wave of public, media 
and political support’ (although noting that it was too belated) and its 
effect in giving the industry a brief stay, BACM noted the inexorable 
moves by government to contract and privatize the industry: ‘it is 
perfectly clear that all this simply going through the motions in order to 
satisfy legislative and political requirements’.125 BACM had become 
strident defenders of nationalization and indeed vocal critics of 
Conservative administrations plans for the industry after 1979. This is 
hardly surprising given the background from which many managers were 
born; most hailed from mining families and communities, and had started 
off working as miners. Nationalization had afforded them tremendous 
individual opportunities and a collective voice. BACM continued to 
represent mangers through the final phase of colliery closures and in 2014 
voted overwhelmingly in favour of joining the Prospect trade union.   
 
Conclusion: Reluctant Trade-Unionists 
 
BACM’s actions, as well as those of individual managers demonstrate a 
more complicated position and range of opinions amongst managers in 
the nationalized British coal industry than has been portrayed in much of 
the literature. In their 1971 study, Managers and their Wives, Jan and Ray 
Pahl observed that managers were little understood. However, contrary to 
assumptions the Pahls noted:  
We have certainly detected a degree of ambivalence and uncertainty 
towards the basic materialistic values which are often assumed to be 
dominant by politicians and spokesmen for British industry. That so 
many of the middle-class couples we studied showed such ambiguity 
towards the basic values of a competitive society has far-reaching 
implications.126 
 
BACM’s position from the 1970s onwards was characteristic of that 
uncertainty.  While the state may have acted as a midwife to managerial 
unionism, conversely frustration over centralized control and the 
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contraction of the industry from the late 1950s onwards increased 
recruitment to BACM and saw the Union adopt a more stridently 
independent position and seek alliances with other unions. BACM was 
transformed from a conservative staff association and reluctant partner in 
nationalization, as epitomized by the first President and General-
Secretary, Walton-Brown and Anderson, to an independent managerial 
trade union, as represented by Bullock and Tyler. From the 1970s, and 
especially the 1980s and 1990s, BACM’s leadership had to contend with 
positioning themselves during the national strikes of the 1970s and 1984-
5, and ultimately an assault on the long-term future of the industry and 
nationalization.  This was especially visible with the open confrontations 
with Ian MacGregor. This period also saw considerable tension within 
BACM’s ranks between mining engineers and other mining groups, which 
Alexander, in particular, was forced to confront. 
 
In most respects, BACM complied with Blackburn’s model of 
‘unionateness’.  Part of the challenge for Bullock, Tyler and their 
successors – as demonstrated over issues such as strike cover, TUC 
affiliation – was in managing different sectional interests and regional/ 
national branches, experiencing contraction and growth, against the 
shifting political economy of energy in the UK. Ultimately, what would 
bring some unity to the mining unions was the survival of their industry in 
a hostile policy environment. That commitment to the industry, and 
recognition of the reliance of coalfield communities on it for survival, calls 
into question the suggestions made by McCormick that managers 
unquestionably remained wedded to their employers and Bain’s that 
managerial employees were unaffected by social location or occupational 
identity.  BACM’s actions reflected the profoundly contested position that 
managers occupied in the changing context of the nationalized British coal 
industry when the collective resources and the very fabric of mining 
communities were under threat.  The divisions witnessed among 
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